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This paper introduces a parameter-free method for measuring the weighting functions of 12 
prospect theory and rank-dependent utility.  These weighting functions capture risk attitudes, 13 
subjective beliefs, and ambiguity attitudes.  Our method, called the midweight method, is 14 
based on a convenient way to obtain midpoints in the weighting function scale.  It can be used 15 
both for risk (known probabilities) and for uncertainty (unknown probabilities).  The resulting 16 
integrated treatment of risk and uncertainty is particularly useful for measuring the differences 17 
between them: ambiguity.  Compared to existing methods to measure ambiguity attitudes, our 18 
method is more efficient and it can accommodate violations of expected utility under risk.  An 19 
experiment demonstrates the feasibility and tractability of our method, yielding plausible 20 
results such as ambiguity aversion for moderate and high likelihoods but ambiguity seeking 21 
for low likelihoods, as predicted by Ellsberg. 22 
 23 
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1.  Introduction 25 
 Because of the many violations of expected utility (Starmer 2000, Gilboa 2004), 26 
nonexpected utility theories have been developed so as to better explain empirical findings.  27 
Most nonexpected utility theories use weighting functions that generalize (subjective) 28 
probabilities by relaxing additivity.  Obviously, the increased flexibility for accommodating 29 
data comes at a price: eliciting nonadditive weighting functions takes extra work.  This paper 30 
aims to simplify this work, both for risk (known probabilities) and for ambiguity (no 31 
probabilities are known or conceivable). 32 
 Since Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921), it has been understood that ambiguity is more 33 
important than risk.  Probabilities are rarely known in practice.  Nevertheless, until the late 34 
1980s, virtually all papers in decision theory exclusively dealt with risk.  Some, building on 35 
Savage (1954), did consider uncertainty (which includes both risk and ambiguity) but then 36 
only under the assumption that there exist subjective probabilities, to be used within the 37 
Bayesian expected utility model.  This Bayesian approach stays close to risk and cannot 38 
capture ambiguity that, as demonstrated by Ellsberg (1961), entails a more fundamental 39 
breakaway from risk.  For a long time, no one was able to develop behaviorally sound models 40 
for ambiguity.  Only 68 years after Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921), Schmeidler (1989) and 41 
Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) succeeded in doing so.  Tversky & Kahneman (1992) 42 
incorporated these models into the psychologically founded prospect theory.  Thus, only in 43 
the 1990s could a serious study of ambiguity begin.  Up to today, however, there have only 44 
been few empirical measurements of weighting functions for ambiguity.  They were all 45 
laborious and most measurements, such as those based on the popular multiple priors and α 46 
maxmin models (Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989), assumed the descriptively problematic 47 
expected utility model for risk. 48 
 For the special case of risk, many studies have measured probability weighting functions 49 
through parametric fitting techniques (Andersen et al. 2007).  Advantages are that these 50 
techniques can be applied to virtually any data set, and that they smooth errors in the data.  A 51 
drawback is that the techniques require prior commitment to particular parametric families.  52 
These impose particular shapes of the weighting function that may not hold in reality, and 53 
give no insights into the prevalence of alternative shapes.  Some examples are Hey & Orme 54 
(1994) and Harless & Camerer (1994) who used power functions, excluding inverse-S shapes, 55 
and Donkers, Meelenberg, & van Soest (2001) who committed to inverse-S shapes, excluding 56 
all other shapes.  Another drawback is that these methods are often subject to colinearity 57 
effects, where utility and the weighting functions have similar effects and cannot be reliably 58 
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separated from the data, with errors in one generating errors in the other (Stott 2006 pp. 112, 59 
121). 60 
 An obvious advantage of nonparametric measurements is that they need no pior 61 
commitment to any shape, and that they will uncover true patterns and phenomena 62 
irrespective of what those are.  They also make clear to what extent utility and weighting 63 
functions overlap or can be separated.  Further, they show how probability weighting and 64 
utility are related to decisions in a transparent manner.  Hence they can be used in interactive 65 
measurement sessions. 66 
 This paper introduces a nonparametric method for eliciting weighting functions that can 67 
be used both for risk and for uncertainty.  Our method is called the midweight method and is 68 
based on an easy way to obtain midpoints in the weighting function scale.  The midweigth 69 
method is more efficient than existing methods both for risk (Abdellaoui 2000; Bleichrodt & 70 
Pinto 2000) and for uncertainty (Abdellaoui et al. 2009; Abdellaoui, Vossmann, & Weber 71 
2005), because it minimizes the need to measure utility.  The only restriction for utility is that 72 
for at least one pair of outcomes a utility midpoint has to be available.  The method yields the 73 
correct weighting functions completely independently of what utility is, avoiding any 74 
colinearity.  We implement our method in experiments both for risk and for uncertainty.  Our 75 
findings agree with the common findings, although we find more pessimism for risk than 76 
mostly found.   77 
 Most studies of ambiguity up to today only measured a single number that should reflect 78 
a universal aversion towards ambiguity of a person.  Abdellaoui et al. (2009) introduced 79 
source functions, and showed how these can capture the full richness of ambiguity and 80 
uncertainty attitudes in a tractable manner.  We show how source functions can be measured 81 
more efficiently using the midweight method.  Our experiments confirm Abdellaoui et al.’s 82 
(2009) finding that people are ambiguity averse for events of moderate and high likelihood, 83 
but are, on the contrary, ambiguity seeking for unlikely events.  This pattern of ambiguity 84 
attitudes was already suggested by Ellsberg (2001, p. 203, p. 206).  It underscores that 85 
ambiguity attitudes cannot be modeled through one single number to reflect a universal 86 
degree of ambiguity aversion. 87 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly presents prospect 88 
theory.  Section 3 introduces the midweight method, first for risk, then for uncertainty.  An 89 
empirical measurement of the weighting function for risk is presented in Section 4.  Section 5 90 
applies the midweight method to measure general uncertainty attitudes, and Section 6 applies 91 
the method to measure source functions and ambiguity.  Discussions and conclusions are in 92 
Sections 7, 8, and 9.  Throughout this paper, we first present results for risk, and then extend 93 
them to uncertainty.  In this way, we make this paper accessible to readers unfamiliar with the 94 
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relatively new models of ambiguity.  This presentation also illustrates that risk is a subcase of 95 
uncertainty rather than a separate case. 96 
 97 
2.  Prospect Theory for Risk and for Uncertainty 98 
 Outcomes are monetary, with —+ the outcome set.  For simplicity, we do not consider 99 
losses (negative outcomes).  Because the midweight method will require no more than three 100 
distinct outcomes, we focus on this case in this theoretical exposition.  For discussions and 101 
motivations of the following theories, see Wakker (2009). 102 
 We first consider decision under risk.  We use Tversky & Kahneman’s (1992) prospect 103 
theory, which coincides with Quiggin’s (1981) rank-dependent utility because we only 104 
consider gains.  It is an improved version of Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) original prospect 105 
theory because it corrects a theoretical problem of probability weighting, and allows more 106 
than two nonzero outcomes (Wu, Zhang, & Abdellaoui 2005).  A prospect (p1:x1, p2:x2, p3:x3) 107 
yields xj with probability pj, j  =  1,2,3.  The pjs are nonnegative and sum to 1.  The prospect is 108 
evaluated by: 109 
 (for x1 ≥ x2 ≥ x3):  w(p1)U(x1) + w((p1 + p2) − w(p1))U(x2) + (1 − w(p1 + p2))U(x3). (2.1) 110 
Here U denotes utility, which is continuous and strictly increasing.  The (probability) 111 
weighting function w maps [0,1] to [0,1] and is strictly increasing and continuous, with w(0) = 112 
0 and w(1) = 1.  In what follows, xpy denotes the two-outcome prospect yielding x with 113 
probability p and y with probability 1−p. 114 
 We now turn to decision under uncertainty.  The major improvement of Tversky & 115 
Kahneman’s (1992) prospect theory relative to the 1979 version was that the new theory 116 
could handle not only risk, but also the more important context of uncertainty (which includes 117 
ambiguity).  We will use this extension in our study, where it coincides with Gilboa’s (1987) 118 
and Schmeidler’s (1989) rank-dependent utility because no losses are involved.  Under 119 
uncertainty, prospects assign outcomes to uncertain events of which the probabilities need not 120 
be known.  In our experiment, the uncertain events concern the average temperature in the 121 
Dutch city Eindhoven 11 days ahead.  (E1:x1, E2:x2, E3:x3) denotes the prospect yielding xj if 122 
Ej obtains, where the Ejs denote three temperature intervals, or unions of temperature 123 
intervals.  It is always understood that the Ejs are exhaustive and mutually exclusive.  Our 124 
subjects had no statistics available so that they did not know the probabilities of these events.  125 
Statistics of the past, even if available, would not have eliminated all ambiguity because of 126 
changed circumstances today, such as because of global warming.  xEy denotes the prospect 127 
yielding x under event E and y otherwise.   128 
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 We use utility U as before, but instead of the weighting function w for probabilities we 129 
use a function W defined on events.  For reasons explained later, W is called a(n event) 130 
weighting function.  W assigns weight 0 to the vacuous event and weight 1 to the universal 131 
event, and A ⊃ B implies W(A) ≥ W(B).  W shares these properties with probability measures.  132 
However, W(A∪B) ≠ W(A) + W(B) may hold for disjoint events A,B, violating additivity, 133 
and this is where W generalizes probability measures.  A prospect (E1:x1, E2:x2, E3:x3) is 134 
evaluated by: 135 
 (for x1 ≥ x2 ≥ x3):  W(E1)U(x1) + (W(E1∪E2) − W(E1))U(x2) + (1 − W(E1∪E2))U(x3). (2.2) 136 
Risk can be considered the special case of uncertainty where probabilities pj are given for the 137 
events Ej, and W(Ej) = w(pj).  So as to maximally clarify that risk is a special case of 138 
uncertainty rather than a separate case, we use the same terms for risk and uncertainty 139 
whenever no confusion arises.   140 
 Convexity of w can be defined as  141 
 w(a + b) − w(b) ≤ w(a + b + i) − w(b + i) for all nonnegative a,b,i.   (2.3) 142 
It is naturally extended to uncertainty, with W convex if 143 
 W(A∪B) − W(B) ≤ W(A∪B∪I) − W(B∪I) for all disjoint sets A,B,I.   (2.4) 144 
Concavity is defined by reversing the inequality signs.  If W is a transform w(P) of a 145 
probability measure P, then under some richness assumptions convexity (concavity) of W is 146 
equivalent to convexity (concavity) of w (Wakker 2009).  Hence, our terminology is 147 
consistent.  In the domain investigated in our study, we equate the often found inverse-S 148 
shape with concavity for unlikely events and convexity for events of moderate and high 149 
likelihood (“cavexity”). 150 
 Assuming zero decision weight (and probability) for single temperature values, it is 151 
immaterial how we take openness and closedness of intervals.  For convenience, we usually 152 
take intervals left-closed and right-open (except occasionally for bound 1). 153 
 154 
3.  The Midweight Method Defined 155 
The midweight method, which will measure midpoints in the weighting scale, starts with 156 
measuring a midpoint of utility.  To this end we measure:  157 
 x2py ~ x1pY and x1py ~ x0pY   for risk, and  158 
  x2Ey ~ x1EY and x1Ey ~ x0EY  for uncertainty, (3.1) 159 
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with x2 > x1 > x0 > Y > y (as in the tradeoff method of Wakker & Deneffe 1996). Then, with 0 < 160 
pi = w(p) or 0 < pi = W(E),  161 
 pi(U(x2) − U(x1)) = (1−pi)(U(Y) − U(y)) = pi(U(x1) − U(x0)), which implies  162 
 U(x2) − U(x1) = U(x1) − U(x0). (3.2) 163 
That is, x1 is the utility midpoint of x2 and x0.  These x-values will be used throughout what 164 
follows, and from here on the preference domain will be restricted to prospects that use only 165 
these three outcomes (called the probability triangle of x0,. x1,.x2 for risk). 166 
 We first present the midweight method for risk.  For any probability a and larger 167 
probability d + a we will find their w-midpoint probability g + a, with 0 < g < d.  We start from 168 
the left prospect L = (a: x2, d: x1, c: x0) in Figure 3.1, with x0, x1, x2 as in Eqs. 3.1 and 3.2 for 169 
risk.  Here d, the probability mass of x1 in the left prospect, will be divided (this is what d 170 
refers to) over the other outcomes to yield the equivalent right prospect R.  g is moved to the 171 
high outcome x2, and the remainder b = d−g is moved to the low outcome x0. 172 
 173 
 174 
 175 
 176 
 177 
 178 
 179 
 180 
 Because the proof of the following theorem may be instructive, it is given in the main 181 
text. 182 
 183 
THEOREM 3.1.  The indifference in Figure 3.1 implies that 184 
 w(g + a)  =  w(a) + w(d + a)2   185 
whenever U(x2) − U(x1) = U(x1) − U(x0) > 0. 186 
 187 
PROOF.  Figure 3.2 depicts the decision weights to be derived.  The move of g probability 188 
mass from outcome x1 up to outcome x2 increases the prospect theory value by δ12 × (U(x2) − 189 
U(x1)) where δ12 is the extra decision weight for the upper branch, (w(g+a) − w(a)) (the lower 190 
* in Figure 3.2).  The move of b probability mass from outcome x1 down to outcome x0 191 
decreases the prospect theory value by δ10  × (U(x1) − U(x0)) where δ10 is the extra decision 192 
FIGURE 3.1. Distributing d’s weight evenly over  
the upper and lower branch 
Prospect L Prospect R 
~ 
x2 
x1 
x0 
d 
c 
a 
x2 
x0 b+c 
g+a 
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weight for the lower branch, i.e. (1 − w(g + a)) − (1 − w(d + a)) = w(d+a) − w(g+a) (the upper * 193 
in Figure 3.2).  Dropping the equal utility differences, (w(g+a) − w(a)) = w(d+a) − w(g+a) 194 
must hold so as to preserve indifference.  The theorem follows. 195 
 196 
 197 
 198 
 199 
 200 
 201 
 202 
 203 
 204 
 205 
 206 
 207 
 208 
 209 
 210 
 211 
  · 212 
 213 
 Our approach is general in the sense that the weight-midpoint between any two 214 
probabilities can be measured directly.  The only richness of outcomes needed is that for at 215 
least one pair of outcomes a utility-midpoint exists.  With a method available to measure 216 
midpoints of the weighting function, we can measure the weighting function to any desired 217 
degree of precision.  For example, we can start with p = 0 and q = 1 to find w−1(½), i.e., the 218 
probability corresponding to weight ½.  Then we use p = 0 and  q = w−1(½) to find w−1(¼), and 219 
so on. 220 
 The midweight method can be applied to uncertainty in a way very analogous to risk, as 221 
is explained next.  For any event A and a larger event D∪A a W-midpoint G∪A (G ⊂ D) can 222 
be determined by eliciting indifference between the prospects (A: x2, D: x1, C: x0) and x2G∪Ax0 223 
as in Figure 3.3.   224 
 225 
 226 
 227 
 228 
FIGURE 3.3. Distributing D’s weight evenly over 
the upper and lower branch 
~ 
x2 
x1 
x0 
D 
C 
A 
x2 
x0 B∪C 
G∪A 
## 
c 
d+a a 
pi(x2) b 
w(g+a) 
g+a 
FIGURE 3.2. Decision weights for prospects of Figure 3.1 
w(d+a) 
d+a a 0 0 
1 1 
1 1 
probability 
of x1 
probabi-
lity of x0 
w(a) 
probabi-
lity of x2 
pi(x0) 
p 
w 
pi(x1) 
0 0 
probability of x2 probability of x0 
*
g 
  #: probability moved from x1 to x2 
##: probability moved from x1 to x0 
*
decision weights pi & probabilities for prospect L 
d c 
decision weights pi & probabilities for prospect R 
# 
  *: decision weight moved from U(x1) to U(x2) 
      = decision weight moved from U(x1) to U(x0) 
pi(x2) 
pi(x0) 
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 229 
THEOREM 3.2.  The indifference in Figure 3.3 implies that  230 
 W(G ∪ A) = W(A) + W(D∪A)2   231 
whenever U(x2) − U(x1) = U(x1) − U(x0) > 0.   232 
 233 
PROOF.  The proof is similar to that for risk, with the value increase (W(G∪A) − 234 
W(A))(U(x2) − U(x1)) of the right prospect equal to its value decrease (W(D∪A) − 235 
W(G∪A))(U(x1) − U(x0)), implying the theorem.  · 236 
 237 
A midpoint event G∪A as just constructed exists for all events A and D∪A if the event space 238 
is sufficiently rich (such as a continuum), as for instance in Gilboa’s (1987) preference 239 
foundation. 240 
 241 
4.  Direct Measurement of the Weighting Function for Risk 242 
 This section describes an experiment measuring the weighting function for risk. 243 
 244 
Participants.  N = 78 undergraduate students participated from a wide range of disciplines 245 
recruited at the University of Amsterdam.  They were self-selected from a mailing list of 246 
about 400 people.  14 participants were excluded from the analysis because they gave erratic 247 
or heuristic answers such as always choosing the left prospect or always choosing the right 248 
prospect.  The practice choices of this experiment also served to detect such erratic and 249 
heuristic answers.  These participants apparently did not understand the choices or did not 250 
seriously think about them.  The following analysis is based on the remaining 64 participants 251 
(26 female; median age 21).  Including the excluded participants would not alter the results 252 
presented hereafter.   253 
 254 
Procedure.  Participants were seated in front of personal computers in 7 different sessions 255 
with approximately 11 participants per session.  Participants first received experimental 256 
instructions (see Appendix B), after which the experimental questions followed. 257 
 258 
Stimuli; general.  Participants were asked two practice choice questions to familiarize them 259 
with the experimental procedures.  In each question they chose between a prospect L (left) 260 
and a prospect R (right).  Both prospects yielded prizes depending on the outcome of a roll 261 
9 
 
with two 10-sided dice, each determining one digit of a random number below 100.  Prospects 262 
were framed as in Figure 4.1.  Participants indicated their choice by clicking on the 263 
appropriate button.  They were encouraged to answer at their own pace.  The position of each 264 
prospect was counterbalanced between participants.  265 
 266 
 267 
 268 
 269 
 270 
 271 
 272 
Measuring utility.  We set x0 = 60 and obtained values x1 and x2 to generate indifferences 273 
  x10.2530 ~ 600.2540 and x20.2530 ~ x10.2540.  (4.1) 274 
 (The values that were elicited are printed in bold.)  Then under prospect theory x1 is the 275 
utility midpoint of x0 and x2 (Eq. 3.2).  Because all further measurements in the experiment 276 
depended on the values x1 and x2, these values were elicited twice and the average of the two 277 
values obtained was used as input in the rest of the experiment, so as to reduce noise.  278 
Throughout this paper, indifferences are obtained using a bisection choice method.  Such 279 
methods, while time-consuming, give more consistent results than direct matching (Bardsley 280 
& Moffat 2009; Bostic, Herrnstein, & Luce 1990; Noussair, Robbin, & Ruffieux 2004). 281 
 The particular bisection method that we used is similar to the method used by Abdellaoui 282 
(2000), and is explained in the rest of this paragraph.  To obtain x1 in x10.2530 ~ x00.2540, we 283 
iteratively narrowed down what we call indifference intervals containing the indifference 284 
value of x1 as follows.  Based on extensive pilots, we assumed that x1 would not exceed x0 + 285 
96 and took [x0, x0 + 96) as the first indifference interval, denoted [l1,u1).  To construct the 286 
j+1th indifference interval from the jth indifference interval [lj,uj), we observed the choice 287 
between (lj + uj)/20.2530 and x00.2540.  A left choice meant that the midpoint (lj + uj)/2 exceeded 288 
x1, so that x1 was contained in [lj,
l
j
 + uj
2 ) , which was then defined as the j+1
th
 indifference 289 
interval [lj+1,uj+1).  After a right choice we similarly took [l
j
 + uj
2  ,u
j) as the j+1th indifference 290 
interval [lj+1,uj+1).  We did five iteration steps, ending up with [l6,u6)  (of length 96 × 2−5 = 3), 291 
and took its midpoint as the elicited indifference value x1.  We similarly elicited x2 (substitute 292 
x2 for x1 and x1 for x0 above). 293 
 294 
FIGURE 4.1. The framing of the prospect pairs 
           PROSPECT L 
       roll  probability    prize 
    1 to p                  p %   xi-1 euro 
p+1 to 100        (100 − p)%          Y euro 
          PROSPECT R 
       roll  probability    prize 
    1 to p                  p %   xi  euro 
p+1 to 100         (100 − p)%         y euro 
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Measuring probability weighting for risk.  Using the midweight method we elicited five 295 
probabilities w−1(1/8), w−1(2/8), w−1(4/8), w−1(6/8) and w−1(7/8).  We framed the prospects as 296 
in Figure 4.1.  All left prospects used in the experiment are special cases of Prospect L in 297 
Figure 3.1 with at least one probability 0, so that at most two branches remain. 298 
 299 
 300 
 301 
 302 
 303 
 304 
 305 
 306 
 307 
 308 
 309 
 310 
  311 
 312 
The midweight method concerns indifference between prospect L = (a: x2, d: x1, c: x0) and 313 
prospect R = x2g+ax0 which, as shown in §3, implies that probability g + a is the weight 314 
midpoint between probability a and probability d + a.  For example, to obtain w−1(1/2), the 315 
weight midpoint between 0 and 1, we take, as in the left panel of Figure 4.2, a = 0 and d = 1, so 316 
that prospect L is the degenerate prospect yielding x1 with certainty.  Figure 4.2 lists the 317 
indifferences elicited to obtain the probabilities w−1(1/8), w−1(2/8), w−1(4/8), w−1(6/8), and 318 
w−1(7/8).  In general, to find the g’s to generate the required indifferences, we used a bisection 319 
method as in the outcome part of the experiment, explained in Appendix A. 320 
 321 
Motivating participants.  We used a variation of the random incentive system, the almost 322 
exclusively used real-incentive system for individual choice experiments today (Holt & Laury 323 
2002; Starmer & Sugden 1991), as follows.  For each session there were as many envelopes 324 
as participants, with one envelop containing a blue card and all other envelopes containing a 325 
white card.  Each participant was asked to choose an envelope, after which the participant 326 
who had selected the envelop containing the blue card could play for real.  For this 327 
participant, one choice question was again selected randomly and the chosen prospect in that 328 
choice question was played out for real, with the participant paid according to the prospect 329 
chosen and the outcome that resulted from playing out this prospect.  All other participants in 330 
1−w−1(2/8) ~ 
w−1(4/8) 
x0 
x1 
1−w−1(4/8) 
w−1(2/8) = a+g 
a+g 
x0 
x2 
1−a−g 
x1 ~ 
a+g 
x0 
x2 
1−a−g 
w−1(4/8) = a+g  
~ 
w−1(4/8) 
x1 
x2 
1−w−1(4/8) 
w−1(6/8) = a+g 
a+g 
x0 
x2 
1−a−g 
~ 
w−1(2/8) 
x0 
x1 
w−1(1/8) = a+g 
a+g 
x0 
x2 
1−a−g 
~ 
w−1(6/8) 
x1 
x2 
1−w−1(6/8) 
w−1(7/8) = a+g 
a+g 
x0 
x2 
1−a−g 
FIGURE 4.2. Indifferences to elicit w−1(j/8) 
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a particular session, who had chosen a white card, received a fixed payment of 5.  The 331 
possible monetary outcomes of the prospects used during the experiment ranged from 30 to 332 
approximately 250.  All payments were done privately, immediately at the end of the 333 
experiment.  The average payment under real play was 77.57, so that the total reward per 334 
participant was approximately 11.60, while it took participants about 20 minutes to complete 335 
the experiment.  This version of the random incentive system where only some participants 336 
are paid for real was compared to the more popular rewarding scheme where all participants 337 
are paid for real, with no difference found for static choice, by Harrison et al. (2007, footnote 338 
16) and Armantier (2006). These papers considered static choice, as does our paper. 339 
 340 
Further Stimuli.  Our questions were chained.  It is well-known that chaining can give 341 
incentives for not truthfully answering questions (Harrison 1986).  To check whether 342 
participants had been aware of this possibility, we asked two strategy-check questions: “Was 343 
there any special reason for you to specially choose left more often, or specially choose right 344 
more often?” and “Can you state briefly which method you used to determine your choice?”  345 
These questions were asked in a questionnaire at the end of the experiment, with further 346 
questions about age, study, and gender. 347 
 348 
Results; utility.  The first measurement of outcome x1 (x2) did not differ significantly from its 349 
second measurement (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, z = 1.23, p = 0.2 and z = -1.48, p = 0.14).  350 
We, therefore, take averages of the two measurements in the following analyses.  We had also 351 
used those averages for the stimuli in the experiment. 352 
 The median values of x1 and x2 are 92.25 and 123, respectively, which, together with x0 = 353 
60, suggests linear utility.  The deviation from linearity is not significant (Wilcoxon signed-354 
rank test, z = 0.887, p = 0.3751), in agreement with the common hypothesis that utility is 355 
approximately linear for moderate amounts of money (Rabin 2000).  At the individual level, 356 
22 (38) out of 64 participants exhibited a concave (convex) utility function.  This result is 357 
robust for gender and field of study. 358 
 359 
Results; probability weighting.  There was no order effect for decision weights and we, hence, 360 
pooled the data.  Figure 4.3 displays the median weighting function.  Means were similar to 361 
medians, and standard deviations were approximately 0.2.  Overall we find a convex 362 
(pessimistic) pattern. 363 
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 364 
 365 
 366 
 367 
 368 
 369 
 370 
  371 
 372 
 373 
 374 
 375 
 376 
 377 
 378 
Table 4.1 confirms that participants did not process probabilities linearly, but mostly 379 
underweighted them.  The probabilities w−1(pi) all differ significantly from their 380 
corresponding weights pi except for w−1(7/8). 381 
 382 
TABLE 4.1. Counts of w−1(p) – p > 0 and w−1(p) – p < 0 383 
w-1 (p) – p > 0 < 0 
p = 1/8 49** 15 
p = 2/8 48** 16 
p = 4/8 44** 20 
p = 6/8 44** 18 
p = 7/8 41 23 
  **denotes significance at the 1% level using a two-tailed  384 
                           Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 385 
 386 
 We used a classification system of individual weighting functions of participants of 387 
Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000), where details can be found.  In short, we considered slope 388 
differences, i.e. changes in the average slope of the probability weighting function between 389 
two adjacent probability intervals.  If, for the five adjacent probability interval pairs available 390 
in our data, at least three confirmed a particular shape (convex, concave, or linear) then the 391 
2/8 4/8 6/8 
0.43 0.62 0.29 
7/8 
6/8 
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4/8 
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weighting function was classified as having this shape.  Otherwise the weighting function was 392 
“unclassified.”  We found that 25% of the weighting functions were classified as concave, 393 
62.5% as convex, 0% as linear, and 12.5% remained unclassified.  Although this classification 394 
does not consider the inverse-S shape, it does confirm the prevalence of convex weighting.  395 
All the above analyses were nonparametric.  For every participant we also estimated Prelec’s 396 
(1998) two-parameter weighting function by minimizing the sum of squared residuals.  This 397 
weighting function is given by 398 
  w(p) = e−β(−ln p)α  (4.2) 399 
where α captures likelihood insensitivity (i.e. the degree to which behavior is sensitive 400 
towards changes in likelihood), and β captures the degree of optimism or pessimism.  The 401 
median values of α and β were 1.1454 and 1.5781, while the values of α and β based on 402 
median data, as in representative agent analyses, were α = 1.054, and β = 1.763.  The former 403 
weighting function is depicted in Figure 6.4, and, obviously, accommodates the prevailing 404 
convexity.  Further results, including individual, results are in the web appendix. 405 
 406 
Results; strategy check questions. In the strategy-check questions, no participant revealed 407 
awareness of the chained nature of the questions, or an attempt to strategically exploit this 408 
chaining.  25 participants indicated a combination of (expected or maximal) value and safety, 409 
5 went merely by expected value, and 4 went merely by highest value.  Various other reasons 410 
were given. 411 
 412 
5.  Direct Measurement of the Weighting Function for Uncertainty 413 
 This section describes an experiment measuring the weighting function for uncertainty. 414 
 415 
Participants.  N = 44 undergraduate economics students from a wide range of disciplines were 416 
recruited from the student population at Tilburg University using an online recruitment 417 
system.  The experiment was held on September 11, 2008.  Participants were seated in front 418 
of personal computers in 4 different sessions with about 11 participants per session.  3 419 
participants were excluded form the dataset because they gave erratic answers, such as always 420 
preferring left or right.  The following analysis is based on the remaining 41 participants (21 421 
female; median age 20).  No conclusion would be altered if the 3 participants had been 422 
included. 423 
 424 
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Procedure.  Two practice choices served to familiarize the participants with the experimental 425 
procedure.  In each question, the participants chose between a prospect L (left) and R (right) 426 
by clicking on the corresponding button.  They were encouraged to answer the questions at 427 
their own pace. 428 
 429 
Stimuli.  Prospects yielded prizes depending on the mean temperature (described in °C) in 430 
Eindhoven 11 days after the experiment as measured by the Royal Dutch Meteorological 431 
Institute (KNMI).  Prospects were framed in a way similar to the risk experiment.  As for risk 432 
(Eq. 4.1), we set x0 = 60 and then elicited indifferences: 433 
 x1E30 ~ 60E40 and x2E30 ~x1E40,  (5.1) 434 
but now we used event E of mean temperature exceeding 15.7°C rather than a probability of 435 
0.25.  Again, x1 and x2 were elicited twice, their average was taken, and x1 is the U midpoint 436 
of x0 and x2. 437 
 438 
 439 
 440 
 441 
 442 
 We then measured the W value of events [t,→) (temperature exceeding t).  The 443 
temperatures measured were, in the order of elicitation, t4, t6, t2, t7, and t1, satisfying: 444 
 W[ti,→) = i/8. (5.2) 445 
Obviously, ti decreases in i.  Tij denotes [ti,tj) for ti < tj (i > j); see Figure 5.1.  We write t0 = ∞ 446 
and t8 = −∞.  Indeed, W[t0,→) = 0/8 = 0 and W[t8,→) = 8/8 = 1, as in Eq. 5.2.  Ti0 = [ti,→).  A 447 
bisection choice method was again used to obtain indifferences between prospects.  We used 448 
at most five iterations steps, stopping if the interval obtained was not broader than half a 449 
degree, and took its midpoint as the elicited indifference temperature ti.  Thus, a precision of a 450 
quarter degree results. 451 
t0 t8 t1 t2 t4 t6 t7 
T41 
W = 6/8 
FIGURE 5.1. The ti’s 
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 452 
 453 
 454 
 455 
 456 
 457 
 458 
 459 
 460 
 461 
 462 
 463 
 464 
 465 
 466 
Participants were informed that the average temperature in Eindhoven during the past 50 467 
years had never been below 8.8°C or above 20.4°C. Therefore, the participants were told that 468 
the average temperature could be assumed to be in [7.2°C, 22°C), and this interval was the 469 
starting indifference interval containing t4. 470 
 471 
Motivating participants.  This was done the same way as under risk, with a random incentive 472 
system, white and blue cards, and a show-up fee of 7.50.  For each group, the participant 473 
who selected the blue card was invited to collect the possible prize at any day after the 474 
uncertainty about the temperature had been resolved. 475 
 476 
Results; utility. Again, the first measurement of outcome x1 (x2) did not differ significantly 477 
from the second measurement (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, z = 1.033, p = 0.3017 and z = 478 
−1.424, p = 0.1545).  The median values of x1 and x2 were 77.25 and 91.50, respectively, 479 
which, together with x0 = 60, suggests linear utility on average (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 480 
1.483, p = 0.1381).  Because the subjective likelihoods and subjective weightings may be 481 
different here than under risk, the values x1 and x2 can be expected to be different too; they 482 
were lower.1  However, the absolute size of the x's is immaterial because only their equally 483 
spacedness in utility matters for our analysis.  At the individual level, 22 (38) out of 64 484 
                                                   
1
 The historical probability of event E, based on data from the past 50 years, was 0.25, which is the 
same probability as used under risk.  The participants were not informed about such historical data. 
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participants exhibited a concave (convex) utility function.  This result is robust for gender and 485 
field of study. 486 
 487 
Results; W.  The median ti values are t1 = 19.75, t2 = 16.85, t4 = 13.00, t6 = 10.96, and t7 = 9.70, 488 
with means very similar, and standard deviations approximately 2.5.  Figure 5.3 depicts the 489 
graph assigning the median W(t,→) to every temperature t. 490 
 491 
 492 
 493 
 494 
 495 
 496 
 497 
 498 
 499 
 500 
 501 
Direct Tests of Properties of W.  If we obtain enough quantitative measurements of the 502 
weighting function then we can verify its properties such as additivity, convexity, and 503 
concavity.  It is also possible to test such properties directly from qualitative preferences.  504 
Table 5.1 presents preferences that we observed through direct choices in the experiment (not 505 
allowing for indifferences but adding the top row for clarity), and the way in which they 506 
corroborate various properties of W.  For example, with U(0) = 0, the value of 75T100 in the 507 
middle column is W(T10)U(75), with W applied to the unlikely event T10.  The value of 0T8775 508 
in the right column is W(T70)U(75), with W applied to the likely event T70. 509 
 510 
TABLE 5.1. Observed qualitative preferences. 511 
W W concerns unlikely events W concerns likely events 
additive 75T100 ~ 75T210 0T8775 ~ 0T7675 
convex 75T100 í 75T210 (34%) 0T8775 í 0T7675 (44%) 
concave 75T100 Ç 75T210 (66%)* 0T8775 Ç 0T7675 (56%) 
inverse-S 75T100 Ç 75T210 (66%)* 0T8775 í 0T7675 (44%) 
*: p < 0.05 (A two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test with H0: percentage is 50%.) 512 
 513 
Proof for Table 5.1.  We derive results for convexity of W.  The other results are similar. 514 
1 
21 17 13 9 5 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0 
FIGURE 5.3. The median W(t,→) 
°C 
W 
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 75T210 Ç 75T100 ⇒ W(T21) ≤ W(T10) = 1/8 = W(T20) − W(T10).  Then T21 adds less weight 515 
to the vacuous event (which has weight zero) than to event T10, to which it adds weight 1/8 516 
because it augments the weight W(T10) = 1/8 to W(T20) = 2/8 there.  This corroborates 517 
convexity of W. 518 
 0T7675 Ç 0T8775  ⇒ W(T87∪T60) ≤ W(T70) shows that T87 adds less than 1/8 weight to T60, 519 
which is what it adds to its complement T70.  Again, the marginal W contribution of T87 to the 520 
larger T70 is larger than to the smaller T60, corroborating convexity of W.  · 521 
 522 
For unlikely events, we find significantly more concavity than convexity, rejecting additivity 523 
and agreeing with inverse-S.  For likely events the deviations from additivity were not 524 
significant. 525 
 526 
Discussion.  The values W[t,→) suffice to evaluate all prospects with outcomes increasing in 527 
temperature.2  To evaluate other prospects, more measurements of W are needed.  For 528 
example, for prospects with outcomes decreasing in temperature, we need to measure values 529 
W(←,t).  In the absence of additivity, W(←,t) cannot be inferred from W[t,→) as just 530 
measured because these two values need not sum to 1.  In general, to evaluate a prospect f, we 531 
have to measure W at all events {t: f(t) ≥ α} for all outcomes α of the prospect.  This added 532 
complexity is, as always, the price to pay for working with a more general model. 533 
 In general, the family of nonadditive measures is large, and often special subfamilies are 534 
considered so as to increase tractability.  In the next section we will consider a special 535 
subfamily, put forward by Abdellaoui et al. (2009).  Based on ideas of Tversky & Fox (1995), 536 
Abdellaoui et al. (2009) distinguished different sources of uncertainty.  A source (of 537 
uncertainty) is a group of events that are generated by the same random mechanism.  In our 538 
study, the two tosses of the 10-sided die, used to generate risk, constitute one source of 539 
uncertainty.  The temperature in Eindhoven is another source of uncertainty.  Abdellaoui et al. 540 
(2009) assumed that within each source (generic notation So) there exist subjective 541 
probabilities PSo, and for each source, the weighting function W is a transform wSo(PSo) of 542 
those subjective probabilities.  The transformation wSo depends on the source and is called a 543 
source function.  Probabilistic sophistication within one source characterizes a uniform degree 544 
of ambiguity (Wakker 2008) for that source, and not absence of ambiguity as has sometimes 545 
been claimed (Epstein & Zhang 2001).  In the next section we analyze the uncertain source 546 
concerning temperature in Eindhoven using Abdellaoui et al.'s (2009) method. 547 
                                                   
2
 This can be inferred from Eq. 2.2.  It holds for general prospects f, as can be inferred from the general 
prospect (= rank-dependent) theory formula ∫
—
+W(f−1(U−1[α,→)))dα. 
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 548 
6.  Using Subjective Probabilities to Measure Ambiguity 549 
 This section shows how the midweight method can simplify the analysis of uncertainty 550 
and ambiguity (the difference between uncertainty and risk) proposed by Abdellaoui et al. 551 
(2009).  We assume that probabilistic sophistication holds with a subjective probability 552 
measure P (depending on the participant) for temperature in Eindhoven.  For each temperature 553 
event E, W(E) = wt(P(E)) with wt the Eindhoven-temperature source function. 554 
 The measurement of W can now be simplified considerably.  Thus this section, in 555 
combination with §5, provides a complete measurement of W.  We, first, measure the 556 
subjective probability measure P, something which has to be done also under Bayesian 557 
expected utility.  Next, W as measured in §5 is plotted as a function of P, yielding the source 558 
function wt.  Then, the whole weighting function W = wt(P) has been determined, and all 559 
prospects can be evaluated, including those whose outcomes do not increase in temperature.  560 
With W and wt entirely determined we can, obviously, also investigate all their properties.  561 
For example, expected utility holds if and only if W equals P, i.e. if and only if the source 562 
function wt is linear. 563 
 To measure P note that, with x > 0 and A and B temperature events, we have the 564 
following implication: 565 
 xA0 ~ xB0   ⇒   wt(P(A))U(x) = wt(P(B))U(x)   ⇒   P(A) = P(B). (6.1) 566 
Events A and B as in Eq. 6.1 are called equally likely.  Observations of equal likelihood can 567 
be used to measure P (Savage 1954).  More specifically, we will use the method for eliciting 568 
subjective probabilities of Abdellaoui et al. (2009). 569 
 570 
Stimuli. 571 
 572 
 573 
 574 
 575 
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 577 
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 579 
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 582 
 583 
 We measured, in the order of elicitation, temperatures s4, s6, s2, s7, and s1, such that the 584 
indifferences in Figure 6.1 hold, with the notation s0 = ∞, s8 = −∞, and Sij = [si,sj).  Then 585 
P(si,→) = i/8 for all i, so that the notation is similar to that for the ti's in preceding sections.  586 
The measurement procedure of indifference was the same as in Section 4.  Under expected 587 
utility, sj = tj for all j.   588 
 589 
 590 
 591 
 592 
 593 
Results; subjective probabilities.  Figure 6.3 displays the subjective probability distribution 594 
resulting from the median si's that we observed, together with the historical probability 595 
distribution from the past 50 years regarding September 22.  Our participants generally 596 
considered high temperatures more likely than they were in the past, possibly because of 597 
global warming. 598 
 599 
 600 
 601 
 602 
 603 
 604 
 605 
 606 
 607 
 608 
 609 
 610 
 611 
 612 
 613 
Results; source function.  Figure 6.4 displays the median source function.  To fit domains, we 614 
used linear interpolation in the ti scale.  The source function displays an inverse-S shape with 615 
an intersection with the diagonal at about 0.3, which is confirmed by the values reported in 616 
Table 6.1.  The differences between the W and P are always highly significant, both by t-tests 617 
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and by Wilcoxon tests, except for t2 (which determines T20), which is no surprise because it is 618 
near the expected intersection point where overestimation changes into underestimation. 619 
 620 
 621 
 W Mean P Median P Standard deviation P 
P(T10) 1/8* 0.133 0.081 0.144 
P(T20) 2/8   0.310 0.229 0.218 
P(T40) 4/8* 0.636 0.694 0.238 
P(T60) 6/8* 0.836 0.903 0.155 
P(T70) 7/8* 0.922 0.952 0.084 
 622 
 Again, we estimated Prelec’s (1998) two-parameter weighting function (Eq. 4.2) for 623 
every individual by minimizing the sum of squared residuals. The median values of α and β 624 
were 0.684 and 1.208, respectively, while the values of α and β based on the median data 625 
were 0.622 and 1.166. The former weighting function is depicted in Figure 6.4, and, 626 
obviously, accommodates the prevailing inverse-S pattern.  Individual results are in the web 627 
appendix. 628 
 629 
Discussion of results and ambiguity attitudes.  The significant differences between the sis and 630 
the tis provide yet another falsification of expected utility.  Relative to measurements under 631 
expected utility, Abdellaoui et al’s (2009) method requires the measurement of one additional 632 
curve per source.  We emphasize that wt concerns the entire attitude towards uncertainty, 633 
rather than a risk attitude.   634 
 The difference between wt and w (the probability weighting function for risk as 635 
measured in §4) reflects ambiguity.  We can make such a comparison between subjects here.  636 
Within-subject comparisons can obviously be obtained by carrying out both measurements of 637 
§4 and §5 within individuals.  For brevity, we have not carried out such a task here, and leave 638 
it to future studies.  Under universal ambiguity aversion, wt would be below w everywhere, 639 
but this clearly is not the case.  Instead, wt is more inverse-S shaped than w, in agreement 640 
with claims and findings by Curley & Yates (1989), Tversky & Fox (1995), Abdellaoui, 641 
Vossmann, & Weber (2005), Kahn & Sarin (1998, p. 270), Kahneman & Tversky (1979, p. 642 
281), Kilka & Weber (2001), and Weber (1994).  This phenomenon was predicted by Ellsberg 643 
(2001) himself, and shows that modeling ambiguity attitudes through one single number to 644 
reflect a universal degree of ambiguity aversion is crude.  645 
TABLE 6.1. Summary statistics for T-events 
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 646 
7.  Other Measurements in the Literature 647 
Measuring weighting functions for risk.  In parametric fittings, the weighting and utility 648 
functions are usually estimated simultaneously.  Gonzalez & Wu (1999) did not commit to a 649 
parametric family but still used fitting techniques that minimize squared distances, based on a 650 
complex numerical system that requires much data per participant.  In return, their results are 651 
very reliable.  Abdellaoui (2000) and Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000) provided two more tractable 652 
methods for estimating probability weighting functions nonparametrically.  As with all other 653 
measurements used before, but unlike our midweighting method, these methods need a 654 
detailed measurement of utility.  From n observed indifferences we obtain n−2 data points of 655 
the weighting function (plus 1 data point of utility), whereas Abdellaoui (2000) and 656 
Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000), for instance, would obtain only (n−1)/2 data points of probability 657 
weighting (plus (n−1)/2 data points of utility).   658 
 Blavatskyy (2006) described the general procedure of starting with measurements in one 659 
dimension, then using this to obtain measurements in the other dimension, possibly using the 660 
latter again to obtain more refined measurements in the first dimension, and so on.  He 661 
examined general efficiency principles regarding error propagation of such general 662 
procedures. 663 
 664 
Measurements of weighting functions for uncertainty.   We are only aware of measurements 665 
(of more than one or two values) by Diecidue, Wakker, & Zeelenberg (2007) and Kilka & 666 
Weber (2001) who assumed linear utility, Mangelsdorff & Weber (1994) who assumed 667 
expected utility for risk, Abdellaoui, Vossmann, & Weber (2005) who adapted the methods of 668 
Abdellaoui (2000) and Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000) to uncertainty, and Abdellaoui et al. (2009), 669 
Fox, Rogers, & Tversky (1996), Fox & Tversky (1998), Andersen et al. (2007), and Tversky 670 
& Fox (1995) who carried out complex measurements that included measurements of utility 671 
functions.  Furthermore, some studies used direct judgments of subjective probabilities 672 
(Einhorn & Hogarth 1985; Hogarth & Einhorn 1990; Wu & Gonzalez 1999) which are based 673 
on introspection and not on revealed preference.  This paper has focused on revealed-674 
preference based methods. 675 
 676 
Measuring endogenous midpoints.  We used the tradeoff measurement technique of Wakker 677 
& Deneffe (1996) to obtain utility midpoints derived endogenously from preference, as 678 
suggested by Köbberling & Wakker (2003, p. 408).  Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & Paraschiv 679 
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(2007) and Abdellaoui & Munier (1999, Eqs. 1 & 2) similarly used this method.  They next 680 
obtained a probability q with w(q) = 0.5 through what amounts to a degenerate version of 681 
Figure 3.1 with c = 1 and a = 0.  Finally, they used this probability to efficiently measure utility 682 
midpoints in general.  Their approach can, like our approach, be interpreted as a special case 683 
of Blavatskyy’s (2006) general procedure. 684 
 Vind (1991, p. 134; 2003, §IV.2, above Theorem IV.2.1) proposed an alternative method 685 
for obtaining endogenous utility midpoints under expected utility and, more generally, under 686 
state-dependent expected utility (from which he derived what he called a mean groupoid 687 
operation).  He showed that y is the utility midpoint between x and z if the following 688 
indifferences hold: 689 
 x ~ x1qx2, z ~ z1qz2, and x1qz2 ~ z1qx2 ~ y. (8.1)  690 
His method holds under prospect theory if we add the requirement that x1 > x2, x1 > z2, z1 > z2, 691 
and z1 > x2.  692 
 Ghirardato et al. (2003, Definition 4) proposed another method to derive utility midpoints 693 
endogenously from preferences.  They showed that β is the utility midpoint between α and γ 694 
under prospect theory if the following indifferences hold: 695 
 αqγ ~ xqy, x ~ αqβ, and y ~ βqγ (8.2) 696 
with α > β > γ.   697 
 With β a utility midpoint between α and γ, the tradeoff method has γ as dependent 698 
variable and α and β as independent variables, whereas the other two methods have β as 699 
dependent variable and α and γ as independent variables.  In the former case, the 700 
experimenter has no control over the range (α,γ), which entails a drawback of the tradeoff 701 
method.  We still preferred this method because it requires fewer indifferences to be measured 702 
and is easier to implement experimentally. 703 
 704 
8.  General Discussion 705 
 Empirical studies have found that individual weighting functions are mostly convex or 706 
inverse-S shaped, with the latter shape prevailing.  Thus, the majority of studies found that a 707 
majority of participants exhibited the inverse-S shape.  We are aware of some 50 such 708 
references (Web-Appendix F).  Yet, the finding is not universal, and several studies did not 709 
23 
 
only find convex weighting functions for some of their participants, but even for a majority, 710 
as we did for risk.3  Many other studies found other evidence against inverse-S.4   711 
 Thus, although we believe that inverse-S is the prevailing phenomenon, it certainly is not 712 
universal.  It is not clear at this stage why different studies have found different results.  Much 713 
about weighting functions remains yet to be discovered.  Our findings and literature search 714 
suggest once more that probability weighting is a volatile phenomenon, with results 715 
depending on framing and ways of measurement, and with no phenomena holding in great 716 
generality.  As one admittedly after-the-fact explanation, our design may have suppressed 717 
inverse-S somewhat because we kept outcomes fixed and focused on uncertainty, enhancing 718 
sensitivity towards uncertainty.  Inverse-S entails insensitivity towards uncertainty.  For risk 719 
this effect may have been enough to suppress the inverse-S shape.  Because inverse-S is more 720 
pronounced for unknown probabilities, it may still have shown up for those.  Our restriction 721 
to prospects from the boundary of the probability triangle may also have contributed to the 722 
extra pessimism. 723 
 In the experiment we used the midweight method to measure the weighting function over 724 
its whole domain.  The method can also be used to investigate the local curvature of the 725 
weighting function.  For example, if we want to know whether the weighting function is 726 
convex on a particular domain [a,c), then we can use our method to find the w-midpoint q 727 
between a and c, and then the w-midpoint between a and q, and so on, and in this manner we 728 
obtain local tests of convexity on [a,c). 729 
 The values x1, x2, and w−1(p) that were elicited from participants returned as inputs in 730 
later questions (chaining), and bisection also involves chaining.  It is well known that 731 
participants can exploit chaining by not answering truthfully at particular questions so as to 732 
improve stimuli in future questions (Harrison 1986).  Such a distortion is unlikely to have 733 
arisen in our experiment.  It is difficult for participants to understand that their anwer to one 734 
question will influence future stimuli.  For example, we did not directly ask for the 735 
indifference values used in future questions, but derived indifference values indirectly as 736 
midpoints between values used in choices, so that participants had not seen the indifference 737 
                                                   
3
  See Goeree, Holt, & Palfrey (2002), Jullien & Salanié (2000), Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & 
Perner (1999, p. 217), Li et al. (2009), Mosteller & Nogee (1951 in their student population), and Qiu 
& Steiger (2008). 
4
 See Barron & Erev (2003), Bearden, Wallsten, & Fox (2007), Birnbaum (2008, in particular pp. 484-
486, and the many references to his preceding studies), Bleichrodt (2001), Fatas, Neugebauer, & 
Tamborero (2007), Goeree, Holt, & Palfrey (2003), Hartinger (1999), Henrich & Mcelreat (2002), 
Humphrey & Verschoor (2004), Kunreuther & Pauly (2003), Loomes (1991), Loomes, Moffat, & 
Sugden (2002), Luce (1996), and Stott (2006). 
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values before and in this way could not recognize them.  In addition, to exploit chaining, not 738 
only the presence of chaining must be understood, but also the way in which future questions 739 
will depend on current answers, which will be very hard for subjects.  Finally, our strategy-740 
check questions revealed no strategic exploitation of chaining.  We carefully formulated our 741 
instructions (end of Appendix B) in order to avoid deception. 742 
 We used the term “prospect” not only in our theoretical analysis, but also in the 743 
instructions and in the experiment.  We did so because the term is neutral and avoids potential 744 
confounding effects resulting from connotations with terms such as lottery or gamble. 745 
 Because existing empirical evidence suggests that the most interesting behavioral 746 
phenomena occur when uncertain events are very likely or very unlikely to occur, we 747 
partitioned the events T02, T68, S02, and S08, but not the events T24, T26, S24, and S26.  Following 748 
Abdellaoui et al. (2009), we chose not to partition the latter events so as to reduce the burden 749 
on participants.  750 
 751 
9.  Conclusion 752 
 We have introduced a new method for measuring functions that weigh risk and 753 
uncertainty.  It is almost double as efficient as methods that have been used before because it 754 
minimizes the required measurements of utility.  Experiments have demonstrated the 755 
feasibility of our method for both risk and uncertainty.  A desirable feature of our method is 756 
that it serves well to study ambiguity, because it can be used for risk and uncertainty in the 757 
same way. 758 
 759 
Appendix A. Bisection to Measure Indifference 760 
 The bisection method to find g to generate an indifference (a: x2, d: x1, c: x0) ~ x2g+ax0 as 761 
in Figure 3.1 proceeded as follows.  We iteratively narrowed down so-called indifference 762 
intervals containing g + a, as follows.  The first indifference interval [b1,u1) was [a, d + a), i.e. 763 
the interval of which the weighting-midpoint was to be found.5  By stochastic dominance, it 764 
contains g + a indeed.  Each participant was first asked to make two practice choices between 765 
a particular prospect L and prospect R = x2g++ax0 = x2g−+ax0, where probability g
+
 + a (g- + a) was 766 
                                                   
5
 The first indifference interval is, thus, [0,1] for w−1(4/8), [0, w−1(4/8)) for w−1(2/8),  [w−1(4/8), 1] for 
w−1(6/8), [0, w−1(2/8)) for w−1(1/8), and [w−1(6/8), 1] for w−1(7/8). 
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set equal to the upper (lower) limit of the range of the first indifference interval of probability 767 
g + a minus (plus) 1/100.  Then the iterative process started. 768 
 To construct the j + 1th indifference interval [bj+1,uj+1) from the jth indifference interval 769 
[bj,uj), we elicited whether the midpoint of [bj,uj) was larger or smaller than a + g.  To do so, 770 
we observed the choice between (a: x2, d: x1, c: x0) and x2(bj+uj)/2x0.  A right choice meant that 771 
the midpoint was larger than g + a, so that g + a was contained in [bj,b
j
 + uj
2  ), which was then 772 
defined as the j + 1th indifference interval [bj+1,uj+1).  A left choice meant that the midpoint was 773 
smaller than g + a, so that g + a was contained in [b
j
 + uj
2  ,u
j), which was then defined as the j + 774 
1th indifference interval [bj+1,uj+1).  We did five iteration steps like this, ending up with [b6,u6), 775 
and took its midpoint as the elicited indifference probability a + g.6 776 
 As an illustration, Figure A.1 replicates the bisection procedure followed to obtain the 777 
probability corresponding to the weight of 0.5.  The particular pattern of answers depicted 778 
there, preferring the right prospect twice and the left prospect three times, was exhibited by 6 779 
of our participants.  After the fifth iteration step, the midpoint of the last indifference interval 780 
was taken as the final indifference probability.  Thus, individual indifference between the 781 
certain prospect (x1) and the prospect x20.615x0 was inferred from the choices made by the 6 782 
participants whose choices are replicated in Figure A.1. 783 
                                                   
6
 Because prospects yielded prizes depending on the result of a roll with two ten-sided dice, we only 
allowed values j/100 for probabilities.  When a particular midpoint probability was not a value j/100, 
the computer took the closest value j/100 on the left of this value if the value was lower than half and 
on the right of this value if the value was higher than half.  The order of elicitation was varied between 
participants to prevent potential order effects.  For some participants the order of elicitation was 
w−1(.5), w−1(2/8), w−1(6/8), w−1(1/8), w−1(7/8), whereas for other participants the order of elicitation 
was w−1(.5), w−1(6/8), w−1(2/8), w−1(7/8), w−1(1/8). 
26 
 
 784 
 785 
 786 
 787 
 788 
 789 
 790 
 791 
 792 
 793 
 794 
 795 
 796 
 797 
 798 
 799 
 800 
 801 
 802 
 803 
 804 
 805 
Appendix B. Experimental Instructions 806 
[Instructions have been translated from Dutch into English] 807 
 808 
Welcome to this experiment.  If you have any question while reading these instructions, 809 
please raise your hand.  The experimenter will then come to your table to answer your 810 
question.  This experiment will take about half an hour.  We ask you to make a number of 811 
decisions during this experiment.  Each time, you choose between two so-called “prospects.” 812 
Both prospects yield prizes depending on the roll of the two 10-sided dice similar to the ones 813 
that are on your table right now. 814 
 As you can see, one 10-sided die has the values 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 and the 815 
other 10-sided die has the values 00, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90.  If we code the 816 
x1 
0.50 
x0 
x2 
0.50 
 Choice  
Question 
Prospect L Prospect R Prospect 
chosen 
Indifference 
interval 
1 L [b
1
,u1] = [0, 1] 
[b2,u2] = [0.50, 1] 
0.75 
x0 
x2 
0.25 
0.63 
x0 
x2 
0.37 
0.57 
x0 
x2 
0.43 
0.60 
x0 
x2 
0.40 
x1 
x1 
x1 
x1 
R 
R 
L 
L 
[b3,u3) = [0.50, 0.75) 
[b4,u4) = [0.50, 0.63) 
[b5,u5) = [0.57, 0.63) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
[b6,u6) = [0.60, 0.63); Conclusion x1 
0.615 
x0 
x2 
0.385 
− 
FIGURE A.1. The bisection method for measuring w−1(0.5) 
w−1(0.5) > 0.50 
Inference 
w−1(0.5) < 0.75 
w−1(0.5) < 0.63 
w−1(0.5) > 0.57 
w−1(0.5) > 0.60 
w−1(0.5) ≈ 0.615 
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sum of the roll “a 0 and a 00” as 100, then the sum of a roll with both 10-sided dice yields a 817 
random number from 1 up to 100. 818 
 The prospects from which you have to choose are called Prospect L (left) and Prospect R 819 
(right), and are presented in the following way: 820 
 821 
 822 
 823 
 824 
 825 
In the case depicted here, Prospect L yields a prize of 100 Euro if the sum of the roll with 826 
both 10-sided dice is 1 up to 40 and if the sum of a roll is 41 up to 100, Prospect L yields a 827 
prize of 50 Euro, as you can see.  Similarly, Prospect R yields a prize of 150 Euro if the sum 828 
of a roll with both 10-sided dice is 1 up to 20 and otherwise Prospect R yields a prize of 20 829 
Euro. 830 
 Both the prizes as well as the probabilities of yielding certain prizes can vary across 831 
decisions.  We ask you to choose between Prospect L and Prospect R each time, by clicking 832 
the corresponding button with the mouse. 833 
 For your participation in this experiment, you receive 5 Euro at any rate.  In addition, one 834 
participant will be selected at random at the end of this experiment.  Each participant will then 835 
randomly pick a sealed envelope containing either a white or a blue card.  Participants 836 
selecting an envelope containing a white card receive 5 Euro for their participation.  For the 837 
participant whose envelope contains a blue card, one of their decisions will be selected at 838 
random by rolling both 10-sided dice.  Thereafter, the prize of the chosen prospect in the 839 
decision selected will be determined by rolling the two 10-sided dice again.  The resulting 840 
prize, always larger than 5 Euro, will be paid out to the participant with the blue card. 841 
 There are no right or wrong answers in this experiment.  The experiment exclusively 842 
concerns your own preferences.  Those are what we are interested in.  At every decision it is 843 
best for you to choose the prospect that you want most.  If you select the envelope containing 844 
the blue card at the end of the experiment, that decision can be selected at the end of the 845 
experiment.  Then, the chosen prospect will be played out.  Of course you want that prospect 846 
to be your preferred prospect.  If you have no further questions then you can now start with 847 
the experiment by clicking on the “Continue” button below. 848 
 849 
Acknowledgments.  Han Bleichrodt and Glenn Harrison made helpful comments. 850 
 851 
PROSPECT L 
    roll             probability    prize 
  1 to 40       40% 100 euro 
41 to 100       60%   50 euro 
PROSPECT R 
    roll             probability    prize 
  1 to 20       20% 150 euro 
21 to 100       80%   20 euro 
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